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Chapter I 
Psychology recognizes that d1.f'ferences in behavior are in part, 
a f'unction of the differences in the wq an :lnd1v1dual organizes and 
perce1ves his world. It is also assumed that an individual acts 
d:U'ferently under stress. However. the respect in which dif'fer.i.ng 
perceptiona and d1£fering degrees of anxiety a.f'fect the wq a person 
tends to meet various life situations has not been ful.ly investigated. 
In everydq life situations, decisive choices :must be made) such 
choices mq involve risk t.aJd.rsg. In risk tald.ng, an "1nd1v1dual per-
oeives an e.nv:tronmentaJ. situation that requires a certain behavior to 
avoid failure. It is a condition of uncertainty about the probability 
of f'a:nure lt (Roclcwell. 1962). Researchers have long asked whether 
there is a motivational prec:1iBpositlon toward risk or conservatism in 
the perstmality. Is it more characteristic of certain kinds of people 
than of others? Can it be observed? (KOgan and Wallach, 1964). 
Hesul ts in r1sk-taldng experiments ha.ve been as varied as the 
studies but one consistent finding has been that the willingness to 
take risks is probably no general trait, but rather varies f'ram situ-
ation to situation w.1.thin the same individual (lC.ogan &: Wallach, 1964J 
Slov1c, 1962). It becomes necessary then, to define the ld.nd of r1sk-
1 
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taldng behavior that is being examined at an:! particular time. For 
this stuc:W "amount of risk" is defined as the amount of chance a sub-
ject is ldJling to take in a series of hypothetical llie situations, 
e.g., what probability of success does a person require when risks 
involv:i.ng income, defeat, marriage, etc., are faced? ~e extent to 
which the fear of fa:Uure deters a person and/or the hope ot success 
spurs him on w.l.ll great,q determine his chances of taking a risk. 
Atkinson (1957) has proposed that high anxious subjects are 
pr1mar:Uy motivated by a "fear of fa:Uure" rather than a ·striving 
for success. It Ms leads them to prefer risks of extreme probabil-
it.1es. It 'WOUld seem especially true of the persons high in Iftype..Olf 
anxiety as differentiated OIl the Nicola.v-Walker Perscmal Reaction 
Schedule (PHS). "Type-O" anx1eV is "characterized by ooncern that 
exterDal deands aDd perceived expectancies ~ be overwhelming aDd 
QD.e ma;r suffer harm" (Walker &. H:lcola;y, 1963). 
In an attempt to control or reduoe anxie1r-the degree of sub-
jective probab1ll.ty of faUure-tbe individual restricts his psycho-
logical field to the point where he can master and control it. IJhrough 
this repreSSion or closing the mind to threatening ideas and activities 
the individual loses some of his intellectual l"lexlbillty and freedcm 
(Eriksen &. Eisenstein, 1953). According to Rokeach (1960) this 
defense against anxiety makes an individual more do~t1c as is 
measured by Rokeachts Dogmatism. Scale. He refers to dogmatism as 
being "the closed cognitive organizatiOll of beliefs and disbelief's 
about reali tytt (Rokeach, McGovne,y & llenr\Y, 1955). In this context 
a closed minded person could not so readily "receive, evaluate and 
act em relevant information viewed .t"roIIl the outside on its own 
intrinsio ne r:l. ts" (Rokeach, 1960). 
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It would appear then, that anxiev together with closed mindedness 
(dogmati311l) would prevent an ind:l.v1dual .t"rcm evaluating and acting to 
the best of his interests. 111., according to AUdnson's theor,y, 
this should mean that he w:Ul take risks which tend to be inq:Julsive 
aDd. axlir'eme rather than ones with modera.te probali l1t1es. 
1b1s stu.dy' is a repJ.1caUOI1 and an extension of part of Rokeach' s 
work a 
1) to :mea.sure the relationship between dogmatism and the various 
kinds of anxiev as determined by the d1tterential anxietu scale (PRS) , 
particul.ar1ly fttqpe-O." 
2) to determine the relatiODBhip tha.t mq exist betI4'een anxiety 
and risk tak1ng in both high dogma.tic and low dogmatic individuals. 
Chapter n 
Rev:lew o£ Related Literature 
Risk taking has long been studied treD. a broad range ot approaches. 
Gamblers, economists I psycholoe1sts, as well as the average man, have 
been searching tor answers 1'rom which risk-tald..ng behavior can be 
predicted. ']hus tar, researchers have not been too successfuJ. in 
finding a 'Wtl;r to measure and predict this variable. Slavic (1962) 
came to the conclusion, after assessing the current research, that 
there is a lack o£ convergent valid1 ty among risk-tald.ng me~""Ures. 
He fUrther stated that possibly risk t,aking was no general trait at 
all, but ra.ther one which varies .from situation to si tuat10n within 
the same individual. Risk-taking behavior appears to be mult1dimen-
sional in nature. It seems to include a substantial subjective 
component and a variety o£ motivational and other 1nt1uencese Very 
likely, this largely accounts tor the contradictory results tound in 
the research (Slovic, 1964). It therefore, becomes vast:J.:y necessary 
in future research, to adequately define the area o£ concentration. 
Formerly, models ot decision-making ignored personality variables, 
but this was found inadequate tor predicting behavior. SCodel, Ratoosh, 
& Manas (19$9) show the necessity ot incorporating such variables 
into formal. modes. 1hey experimenta.lly showed that 1) the expected 
4 
dollar value has negligible importance in determining betting pre-
ferences, 2) intelligence was not significantly related to degree of 
risk taking and 3) low P83" ott subjects displ~ greater tear of 
tailure than high ptq o£t subjects. 
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Rockwell (1962) sqs that risk exists where the condition of 
uncertainty exists. It implies makibg a subjective judgment when the 
individual does not know, with a high degree of certainty that an 
action taken by him will have a tavorable outcome. ftisk is conoeptual 
tor it is a .function of the person' s perception both of h::ts own 
capabilities and the requirements ot the tasks. Ziller (1957) speaks 
of a ltutil::tty tor risk" in decision mald.ng and Brim (1957) calls it 
udesire for oertainty. n SUch "dUbjective probabilities ll acoord::1ng 
to SUppes and Y4a1ch (1959) govern the estimation ot a. person's chances 
and his relative preferenoes which in blm determine the amount ot 
risk he is ldlling to take. 
In the study ot vocational ohoioes, Ziller (1957) tound that 
deoisions made about lite choices are based on a model of risk. Mahone 
( 1960) concluded. .from his study, that persons fea.r£ul of failure 
tended to be unrealistic in their vocational choice with respect to 
both ability and interest. 1his was due to a relative lack ot relevant 
information about the kinds of interest satisfaction tound in the various 
occupational areas. 
Risk taking also varies with sex. When doing an i tam analyses 
of the chances taken in hypothetical situations, men and women varied 
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as to the s1 tuat10n and the degree of certainty required be.fore ma1d.ng 
a risky decision (Wallach & Kogan, 1959, 1961} Slov1e, 1964). Women 
were highly certain less .frequently than men, but men the;sr were very 
certain they were more willing to take large risks. It was also tound 
that older persons of both sexes require higher probability o:r success 
before consenting to a risky act. It becomes evident, therefore, that 
r1sk-tald.ng behaVior is extremely specific as to ldnd, situ.-1.tion, age, 
and sex. 
In this study :risk-tak1ng behavior will be examined as it is 
mani.tested by decis1ve choices in eve¢v life situations. 1his 1s 
a tandJiar area. ot experience, but an uncommon area to measure. 
Torrance and Ziller (1951) seem to be among the first to construct 
an inventory to assess risk-taking propensities from a knowledge of 
lite experiences. FollO'..r.lng th1s ,Wallach and Kogan (1959, 1961) 
developed a questionnaire to obtain probabU1 ty preferences in every-
day lite 81 tuations. 111is was called the "Dilemmas ot Choice Quea-
tiondaire lf in one study and the "DisutU1ty ot Fallure Indexu in 
another. 1bis questionna.ire 1s f'urther described elsmmere in this 
paper. 
In discussing the "disutillty of ta1lure tt Wallach and Kogan (1959) 
assume that the extent t.o 'WtIich the fear ot tallure deters us and the 
hope ot success spurs us on ldll greatly determine our chances of 
taking risks. Eanotional arousal-tear or hope--seema to be a prereq-
uisite tor excitation ot risk-taking propensities. Feathers (1959) 
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used a model in 'Whicb be assumed independence betlvcen utility and 
subjective probability ot success or failure. But in s~ risk 
taking more extensively (Wallach & Kogan, 1961) it was .found that 
"disutility (deterrence) of failure is positively related to subjective 
probability of failure. 'lhis concept implies that risk taking is 
dependent on motivation. 
Atkinson, in his studies with achievement and anxiety has c3St up 
a theoretical model whereby we can hypothesize about the various 
motivational factors affecting risk taking (Atkinson, 19$7; Atkinson 
& Litwin, 1960; Atkinson, Bastian, Earl & Litw.1n, 1960). He distin-
guishes the "hope of success" persm .from the "tear of failure" perRon 
and f':1.nds tha.t the rela.tive strength of the motive inf1uencing the 
subjective probability of the consequences in consistent with tha.t 
motive. According to his theory, when an individual's motive to 
achieve success 1s stronger than his motive to avoid failure, it 
results in approach motivation, no matter what the level of difficulty 
of the task. 'lhis"hope of success" person is most attracted to tasks 
of intermediate dif'£1cul.ty where the subjective probability of success 
is .$0. em. the other band it the motive to aV'oid tailure-which is 
presumed to be a disposition to became anxious about tailure under 
achievement stress-is strODger it results in avoidant motivation for 
all levels ot difficulty. ibis "tear of failure lt person finds all 
aohievement tasks unattracti va, particuJ.arily ones ot intermed:1ate 
d::U'ficuJ.ty. He prefers instead either very easy and safe underta.king 
a 
or extrauely ditficul t and speculative undertaking, but he must select 
a task even though all the alternatives are threaten1!lg to h:iJn.. nds 
type of parSell sets his aspirati<m level either defensively high or 
defensively lOWe 
Hancock and. Teevan (1964) used Atk:l.nson'tJ model and found it 
predicts verr well in a r:Lsk situation with actual monetary' rewards. 
But sl1gbtJ.y di.:t.ferent £raa A:t1d.nson's findings, their "fear of" fai.lure" 
subjects att.enq>ted to avoid failure by invariabq choosing the dif'ficult 
odds. 1bis choice would not be cause for selt-blame or em'barrasmnent 
since fo.:Uure can be viewed as a function of the d.i.£tieuJ:t odds rather 
than personal. failure. Likewise "fear of failure It subjects made more 
irrational d.ec1siGn.s. 
B.rocV' (1963) also attempted to validate AUdnsonis theoretical 
model wich related ind1v1dual dif'terences in mot! vation to r:Lsk-tald.ng 
bebav1or. His findings were 1D. agrefII8Dt with Atk1naon and Litwin (1960) 
that high ft Achievement, low anxious subjects tend to choose intermed1ate 
risks, but on:q zen these r1sks were measured in terms ot the medie.n 
and. not by subjective conf'idence statements. 
Atkinson end Litwin (1960) oonf'irmed their hypothesis that what 
has been called "teat anxiety-It is a disposition to avoid fa1lure-
follow1ng the werle: or Kandler and Sarason (1952, 1959). In risk taking 
(Rockwell, 1962), an individual perceives an 8I'lT.f..ronmental situation 
which he appraises, then makes a judgPlent relevant to his s1d.1.l 
capabil1ties. Havil'lg done this, the person acts in order to avoid 
.failure. 
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It would seem that the quality of the risk-taking behavior is in 
part a .tunction of the degree of the disposition to avoid failure--
anxiety. 
In the literature there is mu.ch inconsistent and even contradictory 
find'ngs regarding the effect of anxiety on behavior. 1b.ere is reason 
to believe that the various measures of anxiety in current use are not 
all measuring the same thing and turthermore, there pl'Obably is no 
simple or general. relationship. However, there mq be various kinds 
of anxiety and a di.ff'erential anxiety test is needed to measure it as 
Wal.ker and Nicolq (1963) propose to do with the PrlS. 1'a.Ylor and 
Spence (19$2) found high anxious indiv1du.als to have a performance 
decrement but that the disruptive effects of various responses to 
anxiety vary with the nature of the task. Mandler and Sarason (1952) 
saw the relationship as a little more complex-that high anxious 
persans have built up a d1tferent hab1t of responding to anxiety than 
low anxious persons. the high anxious respond to anx1ety with various 
responses, intemal and externaJ., which are incompatible with the 
efficient pursuit of a complex task. '!he low anxious evidently lack 
tb1s strong habit of respond:Sng to anxiety with task-irrelevant 
responses. 
Another characteristic of the high anxious person t s responses 
1s that they are more ego-involved, more selt-oriented and are more 
interfering when threat is perceived in the environment (Sarason, 1960). 
1bere 1s, however, negative correlation of test anxiety with most 
measures of intellectual nbUi ty (&.rason, 1959). ~is kind o£ 
anxiety seems to correspond to that which Walker alld. Nicolay (1963) 
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CCl.ll "type-Otf. ~is subtype of anxiety is character:l.zed by concern 
"that 8X:ternal demands and perceived expectancies may be over-melming 
and one may suffer harm. ft 
Researchers have approached. the problem of anxiety.from the 
standpoint of the defense mechanisms likely to be evoked. 'lhis is 
another, or possibly a better Wa'¥ of explaining indiv1d.ual differences 
due to anxiety. sarason and. Mandler (1952) supposed that high anxious 
subjects react differently because of the differences in the learned 
defense mechanisms that beccmae manifest. ~e low anxious are not as 
likely to be in need of these defenses. 
'When the high anxious individual attempts to control and reduce 
his anxiety, he becomes rigid through repressing the threatening ideas. 
In this wa:;r his alternatives tor acting are reduced and he loses mu.ch 
of his freedom. and flexibility. It is as though he is unable to face 
ambiguities in this world and so he becomes :more r1gid-clinging to 
,!Xternal st1mull-in order not to become completely overwhelmed. All 
ego-def'ense mechanisms produce some degree of unadapt1ve rigidi 'GY in 
the personality (FrendeJ.-Brunswik, 1949. Eriksen &: Elsenstein, 1953. 
Cattell, 1952J Fervin, 1960J Kogan & \iallach, 1964). 
Eventhough we are not concemed in this paper with rigidi 'GY per ~ 
but w1th a related phencm.om.en, dogmatism, there 1s relevance. Dogmatism 
is a higher order and more complexly organized form of inf'lexibility. 
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It is more concemed with ability to integrate "new sets" into a 
current belief system whereas rigidity deals with breaking down old 
patterns of behavior and sets (Rokeaeh, 19$$). llokeach, in his extensive 
work on the open and closed mind (Rokeach, 1960) de£ined dogmatism as 
a "closed cognitive organization of beliefs and disbeliefs about 
reality." He supposes that a person's beliet system is open or closed, 
as indexed by the score on the Dogmatism Scale, and this is dependent 
upon the extent to which that individual "can receive, evaluate and 
act on relevnnt information viewed !'rom the outside on its mJ1l intrin-
sic mente." He then proposes that perha.ps "to the extent that a belief-
disbelief system. is closed it represents a cognitive netirork of defenses 
against anxiety. It 
.Although dogmatism has been chietly observed in the political 
and religious spheres , it is not iIrlpossible to find it in other realms 
of intellectual and cul. tural activity. An individual can be dogmatic 
in his own idiosyncra.tic way, evol v:lJ1g a unique integration of ideas 
and beliets and reality (Rokea.ch, 1954). Cbjective reality is repre-
sented to him by certain beliefs or expectations that he accepts as 
true or talse. Bokeach concludes that the more dogmatic a person's 
belief system is, the more subjected he is to continual stresses and 
strains .from objective and social reality} the more isolation there 
is among the various parts of his baliet system. the more will incoming 
information be seen as irrelevantJ the more threatening \d.1l contra-
dictory events be) the less readily will he be able to face the present 
objective reality and evaluate it in order to be able to make a 
realistic judgment concerning it (Rokeaoh. 1954). 
It can be surmised that it is not so much the anxiety itsel.t 
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that is responsible for the performance decrement as the result of the 
defense employed against the anxiety. 'lhis was also noted by Sarason 
and Mrmdler (1952) and by stone (1964). \fuen testin[; 6th grade boys 
Ruebush (1960) concluded sim:Uarily that the ef'f'act of anxiety on 
perfol'llWlCa, whether facilitating or interfering, is m.ediatad primarily 
by defensive reactions to the anxiety. 
Some have wondered mether amount of risk could be a f'unotion of 
capacity factors. 'lbe general conclusion found was that risk does not 
correlate with intelligence or scholastic achievement to 8lI1' significant 
degree (Stone, 1964; Ziller, 1957). It would sas more likely then, 
that risk-taking behavior depends on personality correlates. 
Beier (1951) fouad the indiv1<ht.al who is faced with threat and 
is in the state of pnx1ety shows a loss of "abstract" abilities or, 
more specifically, he experiences a loss in naxibili ty of intellectual 
i'unction. 'lbis means that the person perceives and interprets each 
new set of st:Lmull. in ~ different wqs according to his needs. His 
ability to judge, to see essential relationships, to sh1tt adequately 
has decreased. 'VJhen asked to act he proj ects his own need-eontusion 
onto the stimuli seeing it in terms of such connicting needs that he 
cannot respond adequately. Rls perceptual field is nal"'l"'OVred. Most 
stimuli appear threatening because the individual cannot cope ld th 
them, hence he is likely to l1ndt his awareness of such experiences. 
His behavior ldll be characterized by rigidity and constriction. 
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Very differing results have been obtained in 'tmich no relation-
Ship was found to exist between anxiety and performance on either a 
rigidity or a perceptual task (Cowen, Hei11zer, Axelrod & Alexander, 
1957). 1h1s author wonders whether different results v;ould have been 
obtained had a ditferential anxiety test been used. 
Kogan and toJallach (1964) had expected anxiety and rigidity to be 
i.nVersely related to risk taking, whereas impulsiveness would be 
positively associated with risk taking. 1hey found no direct rela-
tionship oE anxiety with risk taking. However, persons high in 
anxiety and also high in defensiveness tended to be more irrational 
in risk-taking decisions. RiSk-taking behavior seems to be more a 
tunction of the self-image held by a defensive person. 1hese effects 
are quite dissj,m:iJar across sex which led them to conclude that the 
implications of personality for risk.tllldng behavior are strongly 
sex-linked. 
1:1.llenbaum and Jackman (1961) did a study which !nYol ved a repli-
cntion and an extension of part of Bokeach's ",ork on the relation 
of dogma.tism n.nd anxiety to performance in a problem solving task. 
'-he,y found 1} tha.t in a problem solving task subjects lOt., on dogmatism 
performed more efficiently than those high on dognlatism. 2) there is 
no relationship between generalized anxiety and. a problem solving task 
and 3) that there is a de£inite relation between dogmatism and anxiety 
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scores (r .49). 'lb.e 1st and 2nd conclusions coincide vdth P..okea.ch's 
(1960) findings stating that. to the degree that a. person is open or 
closed depends on how that person views and CM act upon relevant 
information viet.red. from the outside on it.9 Olm intrinsic meriw. 1here 
is no reason then, to think a person acts :in such a lro:y soleIy because 
o£ his position on a generalized onxiety d:imension. 
1116 present study is also a. replication and exten:.>ion of' Rokeach' s 
work, but .lith a few very specif'ic d.if'f'erenees. A d1.t"ferentiated 
anxiety scale (PUS) was used in an effort to clarify same o£ the con-
.tu.s1ng reS'lll ts found wen a generalized anxiety SCfu.e was used. 
Another difference, 'Which is also a variation from. F.Ulenbaum and 
Jackman's study, is the use of a situational-risk index rather than the 
problem solving task. »tis index appears to be a tnler indicator of 
behavior patterns. 
Chapter In 
Procedure 
A. &Ubjects: 
A total of 92 male undergraduates from the treshman class :in 
psychology class, 101, at Loyola University were tested. illese sub-
jects were given three tests (PRS, Dogmatism Scale, Choice D1lemma) 
each on di.f.f"erent day's during their reeular psychology class period. 
Elttreme high and low groups were selected by using the upper 25% 
and the lower 25% of each set of scores. Each extreme group consisted 
ot approx:t.mately 23 subjects. 
B. '!'eats usedl 
1. To procure a ~'U.re ot anxiety, a dilierential anxiety scale, 
the Nico18\Y-Wa.lker Personal Reaction Schedule (PHS) was used. 2his 
relatively nevT measure at anxiety is similar to the older 14AS (1-1an1.f'est 
An.1d..ety Scale) :in that it is a True/False queatiormaire on which the 
subject atte..,ts to his subjective feelings of anxiety. It has however, 
important dll'.l.'erences represent.iJ::Ig some unique innovations. 
Ule P.RS contains three subscales which corresponds to the three 
isolated factors representing three relatively "pure" types of' anxiety. 
ille three sub-scales are operationa.lly defined as a 
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Anxiety Type M (Motor Tension) 
~ M anxiety is charactorized by concern ldth 
external achievements coupled with physical. tenBion 
-which acts aD a defense agairwt feelings of inadequacy. 
vihen frustration occurs, energy is channeled somaticaJ..4r 
instead of psychically. ~ M amdety recul ts in 
l'O'Per-activity. physical and mental restJ.essness, or 
jumpiness • 
.An:ld.ety ~ 0 (Obj cct) 
1YPe 0 anxiety is characterized by concem that 
eA."temal dElWlds and perceived expectancies ma.y be 
Overwiieiirrl.ng and one mq suffer harm. It represents 
a projection or rationalization of one.s possible 
personal inadequacy. It results in a magn1t:ication of 
personal probleas out of proportion to obj sctive reality. 
~e emphasis here is on the EDCtemal as a source of 
uncertainty or unrest. 
Anxiety "7Pe P (Personal Inadequacy) 
Type P anxiety is characterized by concern that 
one may not be capable or meeting the di££icul ties of 
life. ~e person himBe1£ feels inadequate and the 
inadequacy lies wi thin himsel£. 1he.re is a certain 
helplessness and sel.t-evaluation which mrq give rise 
to guilt feelings. DIe focus of' the uncertainty is on 
one's own inadequacy. 
Total anxiety score is the SWIl of ntype-H, If "typewO," "type-P." 
111e total PBS consists of 87 anxiety i tams mixed with 30 K-scale 
items from. the MKPI. 
2. To obta:1n a measure of closed mindedness (dogmatism), 
11Qkeach t s Dogmatism Seale \-laB used. 111e 40 items o.t Bokeach I s last 
revision of the scale (Form E) plus the instructions ware taken from 
1!!!. ~!S!! Closed ~ by MUton Rokeach (1960). Th.e 1temG were 
mixed up 'Tell and padded ldth 22 statements from the Goug'h-San£ord 
Rigidity Scale. 111is latter scale is now included in the Calif'om.ia 
Psychological Inventory where it is labeled FX (Flexibility). 
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SUbjects were asked to mark each statement according to their 
degree of agreement or disagreement, 
plus 1 I agree a little 
plus 2 I agree on the whole 
plus 3 I agree very much 
-1 I disaeree a little 
-2 I disagree on the whole 
-3 I disagree very much 
3. 'lhe amount of risk was determiDed by the amount of chance 
a subject was wUliDg to take :in a series of hypothetical lite 
situations on the Choice Dilemma Procedure. 1his questionnaire was 
developed by Wallach and ~ogan (1959, 1961) to obtain probab:U1ty 
preferences in eve::yday' situations. <a this test each subject is 
presented with 12 hypothetical situations, each requiring a choice 
between a sa:te alternative and a more attractive but risky one. H1s 
task is to illdicate the proba.blli ty of success 'VJh1ch wouJ.d be 
sufficient for him to select the risky alternative. 
Afs an example or the ai tuations presented, the first i tam 
.follows in its entirety: 
Mt-. A, an electrical engineer, Yho is married and 
has one child, has been working for a large electronics 
corporation since graduating !rom college five years ago. 
He is assured of a lite-time job 1dth a modest" though 
adequate, salary, and liberal pension benefits upon 
retirement,. en the other hand, it is very unlikely 
that his salary will increase mu.oh before he retires. 
"Jhile attending a convention, Mr. A is of.fered a job 
with a small, newly founded compan;y wtdch has a ldghly 
uncertain future. ~e new job would pay more to start 
and vrould o.t.fer the possibility o.t a share in the 
ownership :i£ the company SlU"V'1ved the competition o.t the 
larger firms. 
Iaagine that you are advising Mr. A. Listed below 
are several probabilities or odds of the new company's 
proving .financially sound. 
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Plea.se mark in the appropriate space on the answer 
sheet the 100.Jest probability tJlat you \·;ould consider 
acceptable to make it worthwhile for Mr. A to take the 
net;,r job. 
<1. 'lhe chances 3.re 1 in 10 ·Un>.t the COlUp&.r.\)· '!<rill )r'ove 
financially sound. 
b. ~e chances are 3 in 10 ii.a.t. the COlllPnll~y vJill prove 
financially sound. 
c. 'lbe chances are 5 in 10 that the COlll:P~ ".ti.l1 prove 
financially sound. 
d. 'lbe chances ~ 7 in 10 that the company ""ill prove 
financially sound. 
e. 1h.e chances are 9 in 10 t.ba.t the CO!llpaIlY "'rill prove 
i":I.nancially sound. 
- Leave ill the spaces blank 1£ you think Mr. A should 
~ take the new job no matter what the probabilities. 
1be response categories were arranged from chances of one in 
ten upward for the odd items and .f'rc:n high probabilities down to 
chances of one in ten for the even items, thus counterbalnncing 
for an;y order preferences in cboiee of proba.bility levels. Refusal 
to recommend the risky alternative no matter ",mat its probability 
of success was scored as ten. nte larger the probability level 
selected, the greater the amount ot conservatism. 
c. statistics Used: 
1) Pearson Product Moment Correlations betwoen dogmatism scores 
and each ot tlle anxiety scales taken separDtely and togeth~; correla-
tiona of risk tcld..ng with all the scDles of ar.tXiety and doe;m.at1sm. 
2) t test £'01' fi.nding signif.'iccnce of difi'er(>,nce batt·roen tiro r f s 
not, independently distributed but correlated. 
3) ~ group approach I correlations between the various scales 
of anxiety, dogmatism and risk taking with the upper 25% and the 
lower 25% of scores. Significant difference between the extreme 
group correlations-tested by • test. 
D. Specific hypothesis testedl 
1) 7bere is a Significant positive relationship bett-reen scores 
on the dogmatism and anxiety scales (subtypes and total) ba.sed on 
total group of 92 SSe 
2) Anxiety of the f'type-O" sort will be significantJ..y more 
positively correlated to dogmatism. than "t\vpe-P or type-M anxiety 
in total group of Ss. 
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3) 7bere tdll be a signi:ficant d.:1.£terence in the relationship be-
tween anxiety and risk taking for high dogmatic individuals as opposed 
to low dogmatic individuals in the extreme groups of 23 Sa each. 
Chapter IV 
Results 
lhe resuJ.ts, in general .. indicated that there was a significant 
positive relatiODBhip between closed mindedness and anxiety. lhere 
was also a s1gn1f'icant relationship between anxiety and risk taking in 
the high dogmatic individuals but not in the lOtT dogmati,o b'Ubjeots as 
these three variables were operationally defined and manipulated in 
this study. 
Table 1 presents the meana and standard deviations o£ the three 
subtests and total anxiety, dogmatism and risk-taking soores. 
• 
Table 1 
Anxiety, Dogmatism and R1sk-Taldng Soores 
for the Total Group 
(N • 92) 
SCale Hean S.D • 
~M 9.22 3.62 
T.vPe-O 8.82 3.94 
fype-P 8.68 .3.74 
Total M-O-P 26.72 9.3.3 
Dogmatism 101.64 22.17 
Risk TaldDg 68.$2 14 • .30 
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Table 2 presents the correlations existing between dogmatism 
and the various sub-scales n.nd. total anxiety scale ot the N1col.a\r-
Walker Personal l~action Schedule. All ot the correlations differ 
sign1t1cantly.t'roll zero. Correlation of "type-O" aDX1ety 1d.th 
dogmat1sm., however, does not d1tter signit:Loantly f'rom Ittype-M&t or 
Iftype-pn anxiety as was hypothesized. 1h1s latter was determined 
by using the t test tor finding significance of ditference between 
two rts which are not independently distributed, but oorrelated. 
Scale 
f.vpe-M 
1'3Pe-O 
1!fpe-P 
Table 2 
Correlations between Dogmatism. and the 
Various Anxiety Scales 
(N • 92) 
Correlation Ooet.t. Signifioance 
, p 
.26 sig. at .0> 
.37 sig. at .01 
.29 sig. at .01 
Total M-o-p 
.37 sig. at .01 
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Table 3 presents the correlations between the measures of 
anxiety with risk taldng as well as the correlation of dogmatism't.n.th 
r1sk ta.ld.ng. No one of the correlations differs significantly .from 
sero. It is clearly evident that neither anxiety alone or dogmatism 
alone has arq signif'icant innuence on risk taking when computed 
£'rom the total group. 
Table 3 
Correlations of Rt.sk Tald.ng with the Various 
Measures of Anxiety and DogmatiSlil 
(Ii .. 92) 
Scale Oo.rrelaticm Coetf. Signit:Lcance 
Type-M -.06 n.s • 
~ • os n.s • 
!ype-P • 08 n.s • 
Total M-o-p • 03 n.s • 
Dogmatism • 04 n.s. 
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Table 4 shows the means aDd sUlndard deviations for the extreme 
groups in anxiety, dogmatiSlll, and. risk taldng. In each set o£ 
measures the high and low group meano ere at least tlro standard 
deviations in opposite directions fro1l1 the total mean (Table 1). 
~is amount would be S'Il.ffic1ent to make significantly d.1.fterent 
groups. 
Table 4 
Erl.reme Group Scorea tor the Various Measures 
of Anxiety, DogJilatism, and. Risk Taking 
(N • 23) 
High Low 
SCale Means S.D. Heans S.D. 
Type-M 14.09 2.02 4.96 1.02 
1'ype-O 14.09 2.70 4.35 1.26 
~p 13.61 2.97 4.57 1.32 
Total H-O-P 39.22 5.79 15.91 2.72 
Dograati_ 129.74 12.54 73.70 8.78 
a:t.sk Taldng 85.74 7.37 51.09 6.79 
• 
Table 5 presents the means and standard deviations o:t the 
risk tald.ng and various amdety scores in both the high and the 
low dogmatic groups. 
Table 5 
Various .An2d.ety and R1.sk-Taldng Scores 
in High and Low Dogmatic Groups 
(N • 2,3) 
5csle H1gh Dog. Low Dog. 
Means S.D. ~ S.D. 
~M 10.26 3.56 7.78 3.22 
T3Pe-O 10.26 3.32 7.17 3.07 
1YPe-P 9.78 3.77 7.26 3.35 
Total M-o-p 30.30 8.62 22.22 6.76 
Risk Taldng 69.91 15.14 65.87 11.73 
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Table 6 shows the relationship between risk taking and anxiety 
in high dogmatio and low docmat1c individuals. Sinoe high soores on 
risk-taking scale indioates oonservatiSJJ1, it should be remembered that 
a negative oorrelation indioates a relationship to various degrees 
of "riskiness. II ~e marked oorrelations differ signifioantly .from. 
sero nt the .05 level of conf'idence. 
Correla.tionB ot the high dogmatic groups dit£er trolll correlations 
of the low dog:m.a.tic groups at the indicated levels o£ significance. 
2hese dif'terences were tound by using FJ.sher I s statistical technique 
tor .fin.ding ditterences between rls through t.ransformation to SIS 
and computing the standard error ot difference between two SiS. 
Table 6 
Correlations between Anxiety and Risk Taking in 
High and Low Dogmatic Individuals 
(N .. 23) 
• 
H1gh Dog. Low Dog. D1f'f'erence 
between r's 
Type-M and Risk 'laid rag 
-.42* -.12 sig. at • .)4 level 
~ and Risk Taking 
-.44* .18 sig. at .02 level 
~p and Risk Taking 
-.22 .23 sig. at .07 level 
Total 11, .. O-p and Risk Talc. -.44* .14 sig. at .03 level 
'* s1gnifioant at the .OS leVel of confidence 
Table 7 presents the correlations beween dogmatism and the 
various measures ~ amd.ety in both high (conservative) aDd low 
(risky) risk-1;aking individuals. S1gn1t1cant coITelations are 
indicated. 
Table 7 
Cox'relations between the Various .Anxiety Scales 
and Dogmat:l..sa in BotJl High aDd Low 
Risk-Taking Individuals 
(N • 2,) 
High R.T. 
( Consel"V'dotiam) 
~ and Dogmatism • .39 
~ and DogJaatism .08 
fJrpe-P and Dogmatism .OS 
Total M-O-P and Dogmatism .2h. 
Low R.T. 
(Risky) 
.14 
.S8H 
• .38 
.4&1-
'* s!giilHoant attl'ie .cg level ot 'confidence·· 
** s1gnit1cant at the .01 leYel of confidence 
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Tabla 8 presents correlations between dOg1llati.'3Il1 and risk taking 
in various hi[;;h and low llleahureS of anxiety. No one o:f the cor-relations 
differs signi£:tcantJ.y £rom sero. .All correlations however, follow 
the expected direction. 
Table 8 
Correlations between Dogmatism and Risk Tak::i.ng in 
High and Low Measures of Anxiety 
(N • 23) 
-.30 
-.07 
-.22 
Chapt.er V 
Discussion 
'lhe most cler.rly defined reb"Ul ts at this stu.ctr are those 
concerned v:ith h:n;otheses or:.e and two. Hypothesis cme predicts 
relationship betwE.en dogmatism and anxiety following Rokeach's 
work. \Vhen testir..g groups in the lJni ted States and mgland he 
found dogmatism and anxiety to correlate from .36 to .64 (Rokeach. 
1960). AJ.though not as high (Table 2)" this present stu.d;y agrees 
td.th the previous research of Rokeach thut anxiety is greater in 
a relatively closed. system of belitrl:'. 1b sa:y that tldfi relatively 
closed system serves as Ita tightly woven neVN'ork at cognitive 
defenses aga.1nst anxiety" (Rokeaeh" 1960) ctlJUlOt be ~tated for 
oertain, but it can be speculated that closed r.undedness could be 
at least one means of' defense against anxiety. 
~e need to defend against threat, an individual's negree at 
anxiety, seems to determine the extent to uhich a person is open or 
closed to real! ty. According to Rokeach IS (1960) frBZD.e\'lOrk 1Ithin1d.ng 
is not a private at.ta1r" and an open-minded person will more rea.dil.y 
adjust to outside condi tiona because anxiety has not closed him of'.t 
:from the external stimuli that ma:y be a threat. 1\n open-minded" 
non-threatened individual has the freedom to socially orientated. 
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ltrcn the above and from Beier (1951) it \vould seem that the 
individual who uses closed mindedness to allq his an:xi.ety 'tv-auld be 
the person' who ~rlences external stimuli as threatening. He feels 
he cnnnot cope {tt th the threat and consequently is likely to limit his 
awareness or such experiences, i.e. become closed minded. 
Hypothesis tvTO was an extension of the relationship found 
betvreen dogmatism and anxiety' with consideration gi van to :tzP!s of 
anxiety. It was assumed by this author that anxiety steming £rom any 
other source other than external demands would not so readUy correlate 
with closed m::I.ndedness. 
Table 2 af'i'1rms that ntype-Olt anxiety' is numerically more positive, 
but not signU'icantJ.y closer related to dogmatism than "type-M" or 
'ttype-P. ft It does give evidence of the expected tendency. Tables 
6, 7, and 8 all show like evidences and directional tendencies 
regarding "type-on anxiety'. It would seem plausible that anxiety 
related to object.ive and social reality (type-O) could interact more 
closely with closed mindedness in an individual and thus influences 
him more in his risk-taking behavior. Such a person ,,1OUld appear to 
be more closed to reality perhaps as a defense against the threat 
1mrolve<i, and this would hinder his acting to his best advantage. It 
could be conjectured then, that an :1.nd:1:v:l.dual high in "type-o lt anxiety 
'Who is also characterized by closed mindedness is not sufficiently tree 
to say "yes" to the present reality so as to achieve optimal results 
in everyday life situations or decisions. He could not so readily 
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weigh, 51ft and evaluate to his greatest advantage. Further research 
is needed however, to at.t"ir.m the effects o£ such a relationship. 
h'v'enthough the above is also true of "Total" anxiety, for purposes of 
this st;u.ttr it was chosen to concentrate more on tttype-O. n 
Table 3 rather clearly points to the fact that neither anxiety' 
alone or closed. mindedness alone atfect. the types of risks an 
individual is w.Uling to take. Diese results t..rould be in ha.t'lllOl\V 
with hypothesis three statiDg that the two variables in combination 
at.tect an indiv.1.dual.'s behavior in a r:Lsk-tald.ng situation. Kogan 
and Wallach (1964) also found no direct relationship of anxiety' with 
r.l.sk taking, however, anxie'G'r together with defensiveness lIas correlated 
w::I.th processes of risk taking. 
H1Pothes1s three predicted that risk-t.ald..ng behavior trould be 
related to anxiety in the presence of closed mindedness only. ~e 
high negative correlations on Table 6 se. to support this and in the 
direction anticipated. <he speculation for this rather high negative 
correlation is that when closed. mindedness is used. as a defense against 
anxiety it Jllakes the individual less able to receive and. evaluate 
relevant inf'ormation ccmting in .t.rom the outside. Since be cannot 
read:Uy integrate t.b1s new material into his ego system he is not able 
to make the most reasonable judgments that would gi va h1m the greatest 
probability of success. He acts more .tram a ".fear of failure" motive 
in which risk-taking behavior in everyday' situations would be more 
bighl.y ext..reme and impulsive. For this reason he is not as able to 
l1ithhold and control actions in order to ach1eve success. 
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1his seams to coincide with Atkinson' s theo17 regarding achievement 
motivation-that the individual. least threatened and most intently 
striving tor success w:Ul tend to take risks of moderate orobab:Ui ties. 
"" 
~is presupposes his ability "to receive, evaluate and act on relevant 
information" (Rokeach, 1960). 
A negative correlation of -.44 (Table 6) between ntype-Oft anxlety 
and risk t.ald.l1g 1n the hie,h dogmatic group and the correlation in the 
oppos1 te d1re"tion tor the low dogmatic group support Atkinson as well 
as hypothesis three. 'When dogmatism is present with anxiety it leads 
. 
the individual in the direction of extireme and impulsive risks. 
2be conclusions, then.. that can be drawn troa this stu.ciy' are as 
tollows: 
1) In agreement 'td.th Rokeach I s t1nd:1ngs.. a.md.ety is s1gnit1caniJ.7 
correlated "lith dogma:t.1sa. 
2) "1Ype-Otl anxiety is numerically more positiv~ related to 
dogmatism than tttype-pn or ntype-H. ,. 2bere is however, no signUicant 
ditterence among correlations. 
3) "1YPe-0tl amdety and risk tald.Dg correlate signit1cantly' in 
the high dogmatic indi:ri.d.uals, but not in the low dogmatic subjects. 
1his sugr,ests that an individual high in anxiety due to external 
objects imo is also closed minded tends to act in a more rieky'manner. 
i.e., take more extreme and. impulsive risks. 
Alt11!rU.eh we can only speculate as to the meaning ot the relation-
slrl.p between anxiety' and. closed mindedness, this study does indicate 
that closed m1ndedness and anxiety' correlate more higb.ly in individuals 
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who are extremely risky, i.e., take high risks. lhis could indicate 
that closed m:i.ndedness IIllV be used as one de.fense agtdnst anxiety, and 
that tvhen this occurs it does not lead to the most successi'uJ.. decisions 
in risk-taking behavior. 
J\n alternate explanation 'Which points to the inadequacy of closed 
mindedness as a. defense against anxiety can also be speculated. 1I1e 
high negative correlation (Table 6) between "type-Off anxiety and risk 
taJd.ng in the presence of high dogmatic ind1v1.du.als can be used to 
wonder about behmor, it and men dogmat.i.sm is used as a deferwe against 
anx::1.ety. It appears to be a very inadequate means o£ control. 1I1e 
resultant behavior of these high-dogmatic individuals tends to be 
m.ore impulsive and extreme in risk-taking behavioral situations (-.L4). 
On the other hand, when anxiety is de:tended against by another means 
other than closed mindedness-as appears to be the case 'td th the low 
dogmatic group-it allows the individual to be .t'reer, pe.rm1tting him 
to more readily act acoording to his reason and his goals tor success. 
If these assumptions Can be shCMl to be valid-and this vTould be 
suggestion tor further research-then closed. mindedness, and probably 
aJ.:30 rigidity', are clearl¥ maladaptive means of defense against anx1ety'. 
AIIaDg the t.h1Dgs a:rfectiDg a person's perception of the world 
is his "aDX1eV." 'When "fear of failure" is the pr1ma.r7 motive ffSr 
an individual's behavior, it raises that person's am:1eV level 
(AiildDsan, 19S7). ~ would SeeJll to be especia:1.lT true of the 
"t\vpe-O" anxiety (on the N1colq-Walker differential anx1eV scale, 
the Personal Reaction Schedule), m1eh 18 due to uncertain V about 
extemal demands. AccordiDg to liokeach (1~) th1s heightened 
amd.eV should make an 1nd1v1dual more closed minded and mq be a 
def'ense aga:lDst anx1ev. It would appear then, that amd.eV to-
gether td.th closed miIldedness (or dogmatisa) would prevent aD 
1ndividual fna. eyaluatiDg aDd act:l.Dg to the best of his interests. 
1h1s would suggest a pre.terence for extreme probab1l1t1es aDd extreme 
risks 1D ille situations. 
1h1s present s~, then, is a repl.1cation and an extension of 
part of Rokeach's work to discover the relationship existing between 
anx1ev and closed miDdedness aDd to find mtat effect these tvlO 
variables combined have on 1"1sk-taking behavior in everyd:a::r 81 tuations. 
92 male subjects were given the PBS, Rokea.eb IS Dogmatism. SCale 
aDd the Choice Dlleana Procedure .f'rcml uilich were obtained an an:xiety-, 
a "closed m1ndedness II and a Il1"1sk tak1ng It score f!:Jilil __ illilii~~, (s T 
i~sul ts from this study indicate that anxiety 1s sir~cantly 
oorrelated 1dth closed m:l.nd~ess (r .37) from which it is speculated 
that the latter can be used as a de.fense against anxiety. "Type-O" 
anxiety, due to uncertainty about external. objects, was found to be 
numerically :more closely related to closed mindedness, than I'type-pn 
or utype-M, ft yet not signi.f1oantly so. F1nal1y there was the most 
positive evidence that anxiety relates to "r1s1dness t'-interpretad 
as the tendency to take more extreme and impulsive risks-in high 
dogmatio individuals and not so in the low dogmatic. '!his would 
seem to show that a person high. in anxiety, especially fttype-O,t n 
mo is also characterized by "closed m1ndedness, It tends to take more 
extreme risks in order to avoid failure. 'lhese risks do not so 
read:l.ly lead to actions with successful outcomes sinoe they are per-
formed trom the motive to avoid failure rather than to achieve Sllccess. 
An alternate axplanaticm point:lng to the inadequacy of dogmatism 
as a defense against anxiety is also speculated. !his hcn..rever, 
'V-J01ud be suggestian for further research. 
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